South Korea's commercial liberal approach to security by Kang, Cindy.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2002-03
South Korea's commercial liberal approach to security
Kang, Cindy.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5997
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California
THESIS
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

SOUTH KOREA’S COMMERCIAL LIBERAL APPROACH TO
SECURITY 

by

Cindy Kang

March 2002


 Thesis Co-Readers:  Edward A. Olsen         
          Gaye Christoffersen      





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

  i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No.0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response,
including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the
Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1.  AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave
blank)           
2.   REPORT DATE  
March 2002
3.  REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  South Korea’s Commercial Liberal Approach To
Security
5.  FUNDING NUMBERS

6.  AUTHOR (S) Cindy Kang 
7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA  93943-5000
8.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER    
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11.  SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a.  DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 

    This thesis examines South Korea’s approach to security based upon the commercial liberalist
theory. The primary research question was: can economic interdependence through trade decrease the
threat of conflict?  The main thrust of the thesis is to analyze the South Koreans’ effort to elicit
cooperation from its adversaries through economic means.  The thesis starts with South Korea’s
bilateral efforts to induce cooperation first from China and then from North Korea.  Next, the thesis
examines South Korea’s efforts to engage North Korea through a multilateral vehicle such as the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).  Then, the thesis examines the Tumen River Area Development
Program (TRADP) as an alternative multilateral vehicle to engage the North Koreans.  Despite the
challenges of multilateral forums, the thesis proposes that the South Koreans should continue to elicit
cooperation from the North Koreans through economic means.  The thesis is relevant because the U.S. has
played a vital role in the security on the Korean peninsula since the end of World War II and decisions
made by South Korea regarding security matters affects the U.S. and its interests in the region.  
14. SUBJECT TERMS  commercial liberalism, economic interdependence,
multilateralism
15. NUMBER OF
PAGES 71

 16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION OF
REPORT
Unclassified
18. SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS
PAGE
Unclassified
19. SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION OF
ABSTRACT
Unclassified
20. LIMITATION
OF ABSTRACT

UL
NSN 7540-01-280-5500                                                 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
                                                        Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
  ii






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK






















  iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
 
SOUTH KOREA’S COMMERCIAL LIBERAL APPROACH TO SECURITY
 
Cindy Kang 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., University of Washington, 1996 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 
 
 
from the 
 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2002 
 
 
 
 
Author:  Cindy Kang 
 
 
 
Approved by:  Edward A. Olsen 
   Thesis Co-Reader 
 
 
   Gaye Christoffersen 
   Thesis Co-Reader 
 
 
   James J. Wirtz 
   Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
    






  iv























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


















  v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1 
A. PURPOSE ........................................... 2
B. METHODOLOGY ....................................... 2  
C. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................ 3  
D.  RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES .................... 4
II.  SECURITY AND COMMERCIAL LIBERALISM ..................... 7 
A. SOUTH KOREA'S SECURITY THREATS .................... 7
B.  THE THEORY OF COMMERCIAL LIBERALISM ............... 9
C. APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF COMMERCIAL LIBERALISM .... 11
III. ROK-PRC ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP ......................... 17 
A. THE ROK ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MODEL ............... 18
B.  ROK-PRC TRADING RELATIONSHIP ..................... 20
C. THE ADMISSION OF THE TWO KOREAS IN THE UNITED
NATIONS .......................................... 21
D. THE 1994 NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS ............. 21
IV.  ROK-DPRK ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP ........................ 23
A.   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ROK AND THE DPRK
 ECONOMIES ........................................ 23
B.  THE DPRK’S ECONOMIC STATUS ....................... 24
C. THE ROK’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL ........... 29
D.   THE ROK ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY TOWARD THE DPRK ...... 32
E. THE NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE ........................ 34
V.   MULTILATERISM ......................................... 37
A.   ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION ................ 38
B.   BACKGROUND OF APEC AND SOUTH KOREA’S DECISION TO    
PARTICIPATE IN APEC .............................. 38
C.   HOW CAN APEC HELP THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC
CRISIS? .......................................... 41
D.   DPRK’S RESPONSE TO APEC .......................... 44
VI.  LIMITED MULTILATERALISM ............................... 47
     A.   BACKGROUND ON THE TUMEN RIVER AREA DEVELOPMENT
 PROGRAM .......................................... 48
B.   THE ROK AND TRADP ................................ 49
C.   GOALS OF TRADP ................................... 50
D.   CONTINUING VIABILITY OF TRADP AND THE   
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROK-U.S. RELATIONS ............... 54
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MULTILATERAL EFFORTS IN THE
FUTURE ........................................... 57
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................ 59
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................... 65
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................. 71 

  vi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vii
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my
advisors, Professors Edward A. Olsen and Gaye
Christofferesen.  I want to thank them for their guidance
in performing this investigation.  Their knowledge,
dedication, and patience have provided me with an example
to emulate in the years to come.


































  viii












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK



  1
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the Cold War the leaders as well as the
general public in South Korea have understood its security
environment to be anarchic and hostile.1  For them,
international politics was governed more by force than by
international law and morality. The people of South Korea
have learned the iron law of survival of the fittest
through painful historical experiences: annexation under
Japanese colonial rule, national division by the Yalta
agreement, and the outbreak of the Korean War and its
settlement through an unwanted truce agreement.  For them,
North Korea’s grave promise to liberate South Korea by
military force and to instill a communist regime was real. 
Therefore, South Korea’s security measures were based on
the realist prescriptions of maximizing military power and
mobilizing human and material resources.2  However, since
the end of the Cold War, growing economic interdependence
between countries has increased the necessity for them to
cooperate with each other to resolve problems through
peaceful means.  At present, no country can increase its
security by sacrificing the security of other countries. 
To add to the complexity, economic prosperity cannot be
achieved without an effective security policy and vice
versa.
Hence, the South Korean leaders have started to view
security as comprehensive--to include political, military,
and economic concerns.  On one hand, the political and
military concern was clear as the threat came from the
                    
1 Moon, Chung-In.  “South Korea:Recasting Security Paradigms.”  Asian
Security Practices.  Chung-In Moon, ed. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1998, pp 267.
2 Ibid, pp 267.
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North Korean regime and the one million-man army it had
stationed along the demilitarized zone.  On the other hand,
the economic threat was harder to identify because
globalization had made the South Korean economy
interdependent with those of other countries.  In light of
these comprehensive security concerns, the South Korean
leaders needed to adopt a security policy that addressed
these factors.3
A.PURPOSE
 Therefore, the intent of this thesis is to examine the
South Koreans’ approach to decrease their security threats
by applying the principles of the commercial liberal
theory. The theory behind commercial liberalism contends
that growing trade and economic interdependence will
minimize the negative effects of anarchy and gradually
transform the nature of international politics and
international relations, moving it in the direction of a
“trading world.”4
B.METHODOLOGY
This thesis will examine analyses written on
commercial liberalism.  In addition, this thesis will look
at sources that demonstrate how the South Korean leaders
have applied the principles of commercial liberalism to
elicit cooperation from China and North Korea. 
Furthermore, this thesis will rely on information regarding
                    
3 Changsu Kim indicated that the ROK defense minister recognized that
the changing balance on the Korean peninsula warranted a need to think
about security in more comprehensive terms, encompassing economic and
political as well as military factors.  “Competing Security Needs of
the Republic of Korea in the 1990s: In Search of a Peaceful
Reunification.”  The U.S.-South Korean Alliance.  Doug Bandow & Ted
Galen Carpenter, eds.   New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1992, pp
60.
4 Alagappa, Muthiah.  “Introduction.” Asian Security Practices.
Muthiah Alagappa, ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1998, pp 19.  
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multilateral institutions, such as the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) group and the Tumen River Area
Development Program (TRADP).
C.CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY
 Chapter One:  Introduction
 Chapter Two:  This chapter will begin by addressing
what are South Korea’s security threats.  Then this chapter
will examine the theory of commercial liberalism.  Finally,
this chapter will propose how the South Korean leaders can
adopt the principles of commercial liberalism to decrease
the ROK’s security threats.
 Chapter Three:  This chapter looks at how South Korea
has improved its bilateral relationship with China through
the rapidly increasing trade between the two countries. 
This chapter examines a model for the South Korean leaders
to demonstrate how increasing economic interdependence can
produce positive results from a former adversary by
changing they way it views the Republic of Korea (ROK).
 Chapter Four:  This chapter will provide a brief
history of how Japanese colonization has influenced the
economic development on the Korean peninsula.  Next, this
chapter will depict the economic status of the two Koreas
and how the impact of international events has affected
both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and
the ROK. Then this chapter will sum up by stating the North
Koreans’ response to the South’s engagement policy.
 Chapter Five:  This chapter will address the
inadequacies of South Korea’s bilateral engagement policy
toward the North Koreans.  Therefore, this chapter will
explore South Korea’s option of utilizing a multilateral
forum to elicit a positive response from the North Koreans
  4
with the aid of the other countries in the region.  Thus,
this chapter will examine the Asia Pacific Economic
Community (APEC) as a viable mechanism to bring the North
Koreans into the international community and thereby
producing a cooperative response from the DPRK.  
 Chapter Six:  This chapter explains why a limited
multilateral forum will be more successful to bring the
North Koreans into the international community whereas a
fully instituted multilateral organization could not. 
Therefore, this chapter will demonstrate how the Tumen
River Area Development Program (TRADP) can help the North
Koreans in a way that APEC has failed to elicit a positive
response from the DPRK.  Finally, this chapter on the ROK’s
limited multilateral effort will conclude with policy
implications for the ROK-U.S. relations.
 Chapter Seven:  Conclusion
D.RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES
 This thesis is relevant because the United States has
played a vital role in the security on the Korean peninsula
as well as in Northeast Asia since the end of the Korean
War. One of the lessons learned from the Korean War was
that the United States recognized a need for more expertise
on Korean affairs, especially in the diplomatic and armed
services.5  Today, the U.S. still remains actively
interested in the affairs of the countries in the region
and will continue to monitor and be engaged in events in
Northeast Asia in the future.  Moreover, recent terrorist
events in the United States have led American leaders to
focus on the North Korean regime.  Therefore, any decisions
                    
5 Olsen, Edward A.  “U.S. Security Policy and the Two Koreas.”  Korea
in the 21st Century.   Seung, Ho Joo and Tae Hwan Kwak, eds. 
Huntington: Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 2001, pp 185.
  5
made by the South Korean decision-makers regarding security
matters due to a shift in the security paradigm affects the
U.S. and its interests in the region. 
  6
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II. SECURITY AND COMMERCIAL LIBERALISM
The theory of commercial liberalism contends that
growing trade and economic interdependence will minimize
the negative effects of anarchy and gradually transform the
nature of international politics.6  Consequently, the
purpose of this chapter is to examine how South Korea can
decrease its security threats by applying the principles of
commercial liberalism.  Therefore, this chapter will first
identify what are South Korea’s security threats.  Then
this chapter will define the theory of commercial
liberalism in respect to security.  Finally, this chapter
will analyze the security benefits that the theory of
commercial liberalism offers to the ROK that led the
leaders to adopt the ideas embodied in the concept.
A. SOUTH KOREA’S SECURITY THREATS
 Since the division of the Korean peninsula, South
Korea’s main security threat came from the North Korean
military positioned along the demilitarized zone.  In fact,
North Korea’s state ideology of juch’e, with its component
values and professed beliefs that are predominantly
nationalistic, was used as the DPRK’s weapon in fighting
the “legitimacy war.”7  Although juch’e was a declaration of
political independence from China and the Soviet Union8, Kim
Il Sung also adopted this policy to battle the “Western”
imperial powers and their “puppet” regime in South Korea.9
                    
6 Alagappa, Muthiah.  “Introduction.” Asian Security Practices.
Muthiah Alagappa, ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, pp 19.
7 Park, Han Shik.  “North Korea’s Ideology and Unification Policy.” 
The Prospects For Korean Unification.  Speakman, Jay and Chae-Jin Lee,
eds.  Claremont: The Keck Center For International and Strategic
Studies, 1993, pp 102.
 8 Oberdorfer, Don.  The Two Koreas.  New York: Basic Books, 1997, pp
20.
9 Park, Han Shik.  “North Korea’s Ideology and Unification Policy.” 
  8
This impending threat led the South Korean leaders to
adopt a very realist approach toward security.  Therefore,
the South Korean leaders placed the highest importance on
the bilateral alliance treaty with the United States.  The
bilateral security alliance with the United States started
after the Korean War with the 1953 mutual defense treaty. 
This treaty was aimed at protecting the South Koreans from
another North Korean invasion.  Officially, the alliance
meant that the South Korean leaders acknowledged that the
North Korean regime posed a vital threat to the political
legitimacy of the South Korean government.  Consequently,
combating the North Korean military threat meant that the
South Korean government needed to dedicate a large portion
of its national budget to defend the country. 
Initially, allocating money for defense did not
constrain South Korea’s national budget because the United
States provided for the bulk of the strategic finances. 
This allowed the South Korean government to concentrate on
spending money on building up its economic infrastructure. 
As a result, the South Korean economy began to rapidly
develop.  However, during the oil-crisis during the mid
1970s, the United States started to feel the weight of
financing the ROK’s defense.  In the 1980s, the United
States asked the South Korean government to take on more of
the costs of its defense.  
 In response to the United States’ request, the South
Korean government developed a phased payment plan that
steadily increased its spending on defense.10  At the time,
                    
The Prospects For Korean Unification.  Speakman, Jay and Chae-Jin Lee,
eds.  Claremont: The Keck Center For International and Strategic
Studies, 1993, pp 104.
10 Olsen, Edward A.  “Korean Security: Is Japan’s ‘Comprehensive
Security’ Model a Viable Alternative?”  The U.S.- South Korean
  9
and into the early postwar period, the South Korean
government could afford to allocate more because its
economy was in the healthiest state in all of its history.
 However, the South Korean government’s ability to
completely absorb the cost of its defense was seriously
crippled by the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Moreover, the
economic impact led the South Korean leaders to rethink
what constituted “security threats.”  Before the Asian
financial crisis, the South Korean leaders assumed that its
main security threat came from the North.  Since the 1997
Asian financial crisis, the South Korean leaders have begun
more explicitly to view security as comprehensive to
include political, military, and economic factors.  
 Thus, the South Korean leaders needed to adopt an
approach to prevent another attack by the North Koreans
without putting a strain on the ROK’s economy.  As a
result, the most logical solution for the ROK decision-
makers to elicit a positive response from the North Koreans
was to perceive security from a commercial liberalist point
of view.  Therefore, the next section of the chapter will
examine the theory of commercial liberalism.
B. THE THEORY OF COMMERCIAL LIBERALISM
 Commercial liberals argue that deepening inter-
regional market interdependence can reduce the likelihood
of conflict while at the same time it will enhance the
chances for the formation of a security community.11  The
theory of commercial liberalism is important because it can
                    
Alliance.  Bandow, Doug and Tel Galen Carpenter, eds.  New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 1992, pp 139.
11 Moon, Chung-in and Yong-ho Kim.  “East Asian Security
Architecture, Multiple Scenarios, and South Korean Choice.”  Prepared
for presentation at the annual convention of the International Studies
Association, Chicago, February 20-24, 2001, pp 3.
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serve as the new cornerstone in the ROK’s comprehensive
security policy. Therefore, this portion of the chapter has
two purposes.  The first goal of this section is to define
the principles of commercial liberalism.  The second goal
is to relate those principles to security.
 First of all, the theory of commercial liberalism is
essentially an expansion of the international political
economy theory by Robert Gilpin.   A synopsis of Gilpin’s
theory is as follows:
The liberal theory encompasses the principle of
comparative advantage, which holds that any and
all participating countries may benefit from
international trade.  Every state regardless of
its circumstances can produce certain goods or
services relatively efficiently.  By supplying to
the world market goods and services in which it
maintains a comparative advantage and importing
what others can produce more efficiently, trading
states can find a profitable niche and ensure
that their citizens can enjoy favorable price and
quality in a wide range of products.  Therefore,
trading states that are enmeshed in the
international economy have strong incentives to
avoid military conflict: a state would only hurt
itself by making war on its trade and investment
partners and the free flow of capital, goods and
services among the nations is predicated upon a
stable and peaceful international environment.12

By and large, Gilpin argues that liberalism stresses the
power of market forces to erode and penetrate political
boundaries.  On those lines, commercial liberalism expounds
on the liberal theory because it contends that the growing
and inextricable connection between national economic well-
being and the global economy will reduce the importance of
political independence and relative positions, but they
                    
12 Gilpin, Robert.  The Political Economy Of International Relations. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1987, pp 25-41.  
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will do so in the context of interdependence.13  Muthiah
Alagappa states:
Although the military-security compound will
continue to be important, commercial liberalism
holds that the growing and inextricable
connection between national economic well-being
and the global economy will reduce the importance
of political independence and territorial
integrity.  Individual states may still try to
improve their relative positions, but they will
do so in the context of interdependence.  The
international disposition and behavior of states
in a “trading world” will be influenced by
considerations of interdependence rather than by
insecurity born of anarchy.14 

Thus, economic interdependence is the main concept of the
theory of commercial liberalism that led the South Korean
leaders to adopt the ideas embodied in the concept.  The
next section of this chapter will focus on how the South
Korean leaders can apply the commercial liberal theory in
respect to its security concerns.
C. APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF COMMERCIAL LIBERALISM
In his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998,
President Kim Dae Jung stated that along with the task of
bringing about economic recovery from the unprecedented
financial crisis in the fall of 1997, he would regard the
realization of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas
as one of his government’s major political tasks.  Hence,
the Kim administration adopted an engagement policy toward
North Korea commonly known as the “sunshine policy.” 
                    
13 Alagappa, Muthiah.  “Introduction.” Asian Security Practices. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, pp 18.
14 Alagappa, Muthiah.  “Rethinking Security.”  Asian Security
Practices.  Muthiah Alagappa, ed.  Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1999, pp 40.
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According to Kim Hong Nack, the Kim government’s sunshine
policy is based on the following assumptions:15
 Another Korean War can be prevented by helping the
North Koreans’ desperate economy and thereby ease the
anxiety about its survivability.
 The reduction of tensions on the peninsula is
essential for Seoul to attract direct foreign
investment that is indispensable for weathering the
economic repercussions of the 1997 Asian financial
crisis.
 In order to encourage North Korean reform and
openness, the Kim government believes that increased
economic exchanges and cooperation between South and
North Korea will be indispensable.  The increased
contacts with the South will not only expose the North
to outside influence, but also will create economic
ties and interdependence between the South and North.
 It is best to deal first with economic and cultural
exchanges that can be more easily arranged than
political or military ones.
 Peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea is
a prerequisite to the eventual peaceful reunification
of Korea.
Taking these factors into consideration, the theory of
commercial liberalism is applicable to South Korea because
its security concerns include military defense and the
broader effects of globalization.  Moreover, the logic
behind the South Korean leaders’ decision to join a
multilateral forum such as APEC can be understood from what
                    
15 Kim Hong Nack.  “The Kim Dae-Jung Government’s North Korea
Policy.”  Korea and World Affairs Vol.XXIII, No.4: Winter 1999 pp 522.
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Yong Chool Ha and Taehyun Kim call the “global
perspective.”
The globalist perspective is characterized by
optimism based on the integrating force of the
market economy.  Its basic tenet is that the
uninterrupted operation of the market economy
systemically brings about economic growth and
prosperity internally, and economic
interdependence across nations externally.  Such
internal and external consequences of the market
economy form a fundamental basis for
international peace and stability.16

Furthermore free trade, an international expression of
market principles, stimulates international contribution to
domestic growth and prosperity as it allows economies of
scale.  These domestic developments work in favor of
international peace in at least three different ways.
 First, they change people’s psychological and social
traits.  People accustomed to market principles tend
to think in a rational way, in terms of cost-benefit
calculations.  Reason and interests replace passion
and emotions, which often drive aggressive behavior.
 Second, they change the calculus of war.  As national
economies become globalized and the relative
importance of land as a factor of production declines,
there is less to gain from a war of territorial
conquest.    
 Third, industrial development leads to changes in
political regimes.  
Thus, the South Korean leaders can apply the concept
of economic interdependence to engage the North Koreans and
                    
16 Ha, Yong-Chool and Taehyun Kim.  “Reflections on APEC: A Korean
View.”  From APEC to Xanadu.  Hellman, Donald C. and Kenneth B. Pyle,
Eds.  Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, pp 149
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to elicit a positive response that will provide mutual
benefits to the ROK and its adversary.  In other words,
since commercial liberalism’s relevance is limited to
trading states with market economies, the South Korean
leaders hope to gradually help North Korean into becoming a
market economy.17   Overtime, the South Koreans hope that
the North Koreans’ incentive to wage war will dissipate
because war will disrupt trade and other economic
interactions.  In respect to these circumstances,
cooperation rather than competition is the more rational
approach to national security.18 Once the positive benefits
from trade are established in the economic arena, the
positive effects can spillover to other areas such as
military security. 
Whereas the realist vision is predicated on a rather
static and gloomy East Asian regional order, proponents of
commercial liberalism project a much more optimistic
picture.  Furthermore, commercial liberalists intrinsically
believe that international cooperation is more than
possible because rules, norms, principles, and decision-
making procedures embedded in regimes and institutions pose
restraints on state behavior and cultivate cooperation
among states.19  Hence, commercial liberalism presents the
South Korean leaders with an alternative view towards
security that is better than the neo-realist logic in that
                    
17 Alagappa, Muthiah.  “Rethinking Security.” Asian Security
Practices.  Muthiah Alagappa, ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1998, pp 62.
18 Nishino, Tomoharu.  “Commerce and Conflict: Re-examining
Commercial Liberalism:  Dissertation Abstract,”  pp.1
www.princeton.edu/`tnishino/cv/abstract.html
19 Moon, Chung-in and Yong-ho Kim.  “East Asian Security
Architecture, Multiple Scenarios, and South Korean Choice.” Paper
prepared for presentation at the annual convention of the International
Studies Association, Chicago, February 20-24, 2001, pp 12. 
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the negative effects of anarchy can be mitigated if not
overcome.20  The next chapter will demonstrate how the South
Koreans have used the benefits of increasing trade with
China to eventually establish diplomatic ties with it in
1992, thereby fostering greater regional interdependence.
                    
20 Alagappa, Muthiah. “Rethinking Security.” Asian Security
Practices.  Muthiah Alagappa, ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press:
1999, pp 59.
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III. ROK-PRC ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
Throughout the Cold War, the South Korean government
viewed China as an adversary for the following reasons. 
First of all, China was a communist country on the border
of the Korean nation.  Second, the Chinese government
supported the North Korean regime, the ROK’s main security
threat. However, starting from the early 1980s the South
Korean government started to make cultural and social
overtures to China.  These overtures made by the South
Korean government gradually paved the way for improvements
in the relationship between the two countries.  In
addition, there were economic benefits that also helped
pave the way for normalization between Seoul and Beijing in
1992.  The economic benefits that changed China’s behavior
and allowed Beijing to look at the ROK in a more favorable
light were based on the following two reasons.  First, the
ROK provided China with a successful economic development
model and second, the ROK offered the Chinese trade goods
that it needed for its own economic growth.  
Consequently, the importance of this relationship
illustrated how the South Koreans were able to elicit a
positive response from an adversary.  Therefore, the
purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how the South
Korean government was able to normalize its relationship
with China because of the increasing economic
interdependence and benefits of trade between the two
countries.  The first portion of the chapter will give a
brief description of the economic development strategy
under the Park Chung Hee regime upon which the Chinese have
modeled their own economic development strategy.  Then this
chapter will assess the increasing trading relationship
  18
between the two countries.  Finally this chapter will
evaluate two examples where China’s support of North Korea
lessened, in favor of South Korea.  The two examples are
the admission of two Koreas into the United Nations General
Assembly and the Korean peninsula nuclear crisis.
A. THE ROK ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MODEL
In the 1970s, South Korea under Park Chung Hee
undertook an outward approach to its economy.  This meant
that the South Korean leaders adopted an export economy
with some restrictions on the import of foreign goods.21  As
a result of the economic liberalization efforts, South
Korea saw an increased growth in its GNP at the same time
that the country was under authoritarian rule.  
This type of economic development strategy that the
ROK implemented was seen as applicable to China’s own
desire for economic growth under Deng Xiaoping’s
leadership.  Referring to the authoritarian ex-general who
presided over South Korea’s rapid economic growth in 1961-
79, Bruce Cumings asserted that “Deng was really nothing
more than the Park Chung Hee of China.” 22  In addition to
providing China with an economic developmental model, South
Korea offered many trading benefits as well.  Thus, this
next section will discuss mutual trading benefits between
the two countries.
B. ROK-PRC TRADING RELATIONSHIP
The composition of trade between South Korea and China
was beneficial to both countries.23  For example, China
                    
21 Zhao, Quansheng.  “China’s Security Concerns Over The Korean
Peninsula.”  Korea In The 21st Century.  Seung, Ho Joo and Tae Hwan
Twak, eds.  Huntington: Nova Science Publisher, Inc, 2001 pp. 219.
22 Quoted in Roy, Denny.  China’s Foreign Relations.  Lanham: Rowman
& Littlefield publisher, Inc, 1998, pp 211.
23 Cha, Victor.  “Engaging China: The View From Korea.”  Engaging
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offered the South Koreans resources and inexpensive
consumer goods.  On the other hand, the South Koreans
exported to China large quantities of consumer electronics,
including television sets and VCR machines.  Additionally,
China offered cheap labor for the South Korean industries
as South Korea’s average wage was 28 times higher than that
in China.24  As a result, China began to attract much of
South Korea’s direct foreign investment as the South Korean
labor costs continued to increase.  
Arguably, the rapid growth rate of trade between South
Korea and China created legitimate reasons for the two
countries to establish formal diplomatic ties.  For
instance by 1995, the two-way trade between South Korea and
China increased by nearly 45 percent over the 1994 trade,
reaching nearly $17 billion.  Furthermore, by 2001, China
became the ROK’s third largest trading partner and the
second largest country for investment while the ROK became
the fourth largest trading partner of China.25  
 Overall, the comparative advantage of the trade
between the two countries was agreeable to both countries
and produced a more cooperative relationship.  Although
both South Korea and China saw the effects of normalization
and trading relationship with each other as a positive
event, the North Koreans did not.  The North Koreans had a
legitimate concern when China normalized its diplomatic
relations with the ROK in 1992 because this meant that
China now officially recognized two Koreas.  
                    
China.  Johnston, Alastair Iain and Robert S. Ross, Eds.  London:
Routledge, 1999, pp 37.
24 Roy, Denny.  China’s Foreign Relations.  Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publisher, Inc, 1998, pp 212.
25 “Kim Tae-chung, Li Peng on Bilateral Ties, Situation on Korean
Peninsula.”  FBIS 25 May 2001, pp 1.  
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 Since the division of the Korean peninsula, China had
been a staunch supporter of North Korea as the legitimate
Korean nation.  China’s support for the DPRK was mainly
because it was a communist government and fell in line with
China’s greater foreign policy of defeating Western
imperialism.  However, after 1992, China’s support for the
North Korean regime and its actions was no longer firmly
set.  The two cases where China did not support North Korea
were the admission of two Koreas in the United Nations and
the Korean nuclear crisis.
C. THE ADMISSION OF THE TWO KOREAS IN THE UNITED NATIONS
Until the late 1970s there were no contacts between
China and South Korea because China recognized North Korea
as the only Korean state on the peninsula.26  In addition,
prior to 1991, Beijing had a long-established policy
opposing dual membership for the two Koreas in the
international system.  However, by late 1990, concurrent
with the establishment of trade offices with South Korea,
China’s enthusiasm for this policy diminished.  Victor Cha
wrote: 
During Li Peng’s visit to Pyongyang in April to
May 1991, the Chinese Premier informed North
Korean officials that it could not veto an ROK
application for membership, and urged the North
to apply as well.  Li reasoned that dual
membership would be an interim measure that did
not inhibit unification in the future and that
membership would afford the North with
international recognition and improved relations
with the world.  Immediately after Li’s visit,
the North made its dramatic reversal in policy
                    
26 Kim, Taeho.  “Balancing U.S. Alliance & Chinese Cooperation:
Korea’s Emerging Security Challenge.”  Paper prepared for the Asia-
Pacific Symposium March 7 & 8 2000, cosponsored by the National Defense
University and U.S. Pacific Command in Washington D.C. pp 31.
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and sought UN membership.  Both Beijing and Seoul
welcomed this decision.27

The implications of this event illustrated that Seoul’s
position as an important trading partner formed a
foundation for a dramatic shift of China’s foreign policy
in favor of the South Koreans.28 Another example where China
favored the ROK over the DPRK was the 1994 North Korean
nuclear crisis.
D. THE 1994 NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
During the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, China
supported the United States and South Korea on many issues. 
The reasons why China did not support the DPRK was because
it saw the North Koreans’ attempt to acquire a nuclear
capability as a direct measure against the stability on the
Korean peninsula.
 China did not want North Korea to have nuclear
capability partly because, if the two Koreas unified, it
would become a nuclear nation.  Furthermore, the
introduction of nuclear weapons onto the Korean peninsula
might persuade Japan to develop nuclear weapons.29 
Therefore, it backed the ROK and the United States to
pressure the DPRK in signing the Agreed Framework that
resolved the nuclear dispute.  
In general, as the trade amplified between the two
countries, South Korea became an increasingly important
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partner to China.  Thus, the shift in Beijing’s foreign
policy toward the two Koreas was due to the following
reasons.  One, the South Koreans attempted to engage and
gradually improve the bilateral relationship through the
mutual benefits of trade and economic interdependence. 
Second, the friendlier relationship also was in part due to
China’s own desire to achieve economic development and
modernization.30  As a result, South Korea was relatively
successful in its attempt to engage China and produce a
positive response from Beijing.  The next chapter will
examine the South Koreans’ attempt to engage the North
Koreans in the same manner it had with China.   
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IV. ROK-DPRK ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MODEL
This chapter will begin by examining the background
and the current status of both the North and South Korean
economies.  This chapter will first outline a brief history
of how Japanese colonization had set the stage for economic
development on the Korean peninsula.  Then this chapter
will analyze North Korea’s economic policies and how they
played into the current DPRK economic crisis.  Next, this
chapter will assess South Korea’s economic policies and how
the 1997 Asian financial crisis has affected the ROK
decision-makers’ view of security.  Finally, this chapter
will conclude with North Korea’s response to South Korea’s
engagement policy. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ROK AND THE DPRK ECONOMIES
 The Japanese colonization of the Korean peninsula set
the stage for North and South Korean economic development. 
The Japanese had essentially divided the Korean peninsula
into two economic realms.  In the northern part of the
peninsula, the Japanese had built a heavy industry
infrastructure.  However, the Japanese let the southern
portion of the peninsula remain primarily agricultural.
Thus, after the Korean War, the North Koreans had the
infrastructure—albeit severely damaged--to restart their
economy while the South Koreans had to essentially start
from the beginning.  Consequently, during the 1950s and
early 1960s, the North Korean economy was stronger than its
southern counterpart.31  However, the North Korean
totalitarian political system stymied any economic
innovation and it began to fall behind South Korea
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economically by the mid-1970s.32  As a result, despite the
slow start, the economic scale tipped in favor of the South
Koreans when Park Chung Hee came into power and it adopted
an outward-oriented development strategy accompanied by
financial system reforms.33
 Therefore, in order to assess the current economic
status, the section will first analyze North Korea’s
economic development and then this section will look at
South Korea’s economic progression.
B. DPRK’s ECONOMIC STATUS
 In the 1950s, North Korea’s agricultural strategy was
centrally structured. This meant that the institutions of a
market economy—money, prices, and private property rights—
were thoroughly suppressed and replaced by bureaucratic
control by the central planning apparatus. 34   For the most
part, the North Korean system worked, at least on its own
terms.  The planners, following the Stalinist emphasis on
heavy industry and the military, were able to mobilize
resources, building on the industrial legacy of the
colonial period.  
However, the North Korean economy began to regress in
the 1970s when the North Korean system was unable to
successfully make the transition from extensive development
through the mobilization of resources to intensive
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development through raising the productivity of those
resources employed.35  
In addition, the organizing principle behind the North
Korean economy was Juche or self-reliant ideology.  Kim Il
Sung introduced Juche for the economy in 1956, when the
North Koreans encountered difficulty receiving economic aid
from the Soviet Union and the PRC.  The result was the
development of the world’s most autarkic economy, with an
international trade share of roughly 12 percent of GDP. 
This is well below the 50 to 55 percent observed in South
Korea.36  The emphasis on self-reliance was so great that
North Korea never joined the other communist countries in
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).37
Furthermore, the immense military burden that the
North Korean economy had to carry diverted too many
resources away from other projects.  According to some
estimates, North Korean military expenditures in the early
1990s consumed about one-fifth of its GNP.38  Moreover, the
collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies contributed to
the downward turn of North Korea’s economy.39  Since the
Soviet collapse, Russia could no longer provide economic
aid and favorable terms of trade to the DPRK, while the PRC
began to require hard currency transactions.  
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It is also important to note that another reason that
the North Korean economy is in terrible shape is because
there is so little information to study.40  The only
economic information that the government has regularly
released has been the state budget, and even this has not
been announced for several years.  Mundane data such as the
volume and composition of international trade is treated as
a state secret.  
In conjunction with a deteriorating economy, the North
Koreans have experienced several years of bad weather that
caused a famine and culminated in international appeals for
food aid in 1995-97.41  While flooding may have precipitated
the immediate crisis, the origins of the DPRK’s economic
failure lies in decades of mismanagement, starting with the
pursuit of food self-sufficiency that was both wrongheaded
and unsustainable.  The bureaucratic collectivist nature of
North Korean agriculture has been proven to be inefficient,
and has involved bringing inappropriate land into
cultivation and inappropriate application of chemical
fertilizers.  As a result of the agricultural mismanagement
the environmental damage will take decades to repair. 
Moreover, the energy situation is similarly clouded by
a lack of information.  North Korea is reliant on imported
oil to generate fuels and fertilizers for use in
transportation and agriculture.  Oil imports have been
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squeezed by foreign exchange shortages and the reduction in
subsidized supplies from Russia and China (although
recently there have been increased reports of arms-for-oil
deals in the Middle East).  Electricity is mainly generated
using coal and hydropower.  Electricity generation is
hampered by difficulties in extracting increasingly
inaccessible and low quality domestic coal reserves. 
Beyond the problem of lack of energy inputs, the power grid
(largely underground for security purposes) is said to
suffer from extraordinarily large transmission losses.42
The energy problems will be partly addressed through
the U.S.—North Korea Agreed Framework, which provides for
provision of fuel oil during the construction of light-
water nuclear reactors and the rehabilitation of the
electrical grid.  Nevertheless, North Korea will need
additional energy inputs beyond those specified in the
Framework if it is to re-attain its peak level of
electrical consumption.43
Despite the inadequate data on the current situation
of the North Korean economy, one study depicted that in
1990, the DPRK’s per capita income was probably something
on the order of $1,339 to $3,897 purchasing power in
adjusted dollars per year, with an average estimate of
$2,284.44  However, these figures should be taken with large
grains of salt—the practical and conceptual leaps necessary
to arrive at them are daunting, and the mapping between
national income and household welfare is highly uncertain
                    
42 Noland, Marcus.  “The Economic Situation In North Korea.” The Two
Koreas and The United States.  Dong, Wonmo, ed.  Armonk: M.E. Sharpe,
2000, pp 25.
43 Ibid, pp.25
44 Ibid, pp.22.
  28
in centrally planned economies (CPEs), especially those
devoting huge sums to the military.  Since 1990, the
economy has undoubtedly shrunk.  The Bank of Korea (BOK),
the South Korean central bank, estimates a cumulative fall
in output at roughly 25 percent through 1995, a figure
privately confirmed by DPRK officials.45 
However, the best statistical indicator of the state
of the North Korean economy is the declining volume of
international trade.46  A healthy economy located in
Northeast Asia should exhibit strong increases in trade
which can probably be estimated more reliably than income,
is falling.  Cut off from international capital markets,
the DPRK depends on remittances from ethnic Koreans in
Japan and nontraditional sources of foreign exchanges, such
as counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and arms sales, to
cover its financing gap.47
The overall impression that one gets from the North
Korean economic structure is that it is over-centralized,
over-industrialized, plagued by inefficiency and
environmental degradation, able to achieve basic needs
relatively quickly in the past. It has been unsuccessful
since the loss and decline of Soviet and Chinese aid, and
is now subject to substantial negative external shocks. 
However, the real question is whether this economic decay
threatens the regime’s political stability, and by
extension, the interests of other states that would partly
bear the burden of an economic and political collapse in
North Korea. Before this question can be answered, the next
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section will discuss whether the South Koreans are in a
position to help prevent the North Korean economy from
collapsing. 
C. THE ROK’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL
 After the Korean peninsula was freed from the control
of the Japanese, the South Koreans had to struggle to
invigorate South Korea’s economy.  It was during Park’s
regime that rapid economic development occurred and changed
South Korea from basically an agrarian society into an
industrial nation.48  On January 1, 1962, barely six months
after the military takeover, President Park announced the
“First Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 1962-1966.”49 
The swiftly drawn first five-year economic development plan
was followed up by more carefully crafted economic
development plans.  Thus, the need for rapid economic
growth was clear as South Korea was transformed into a
mobilized workplace.  A regimented “Confucian” and
paternalistic “Korea, Inc.” was born.  
 The main policy features and stages of the Park
government’s direct involvement in pushing rapid economic
growth was summarized as follows: 
Active governmental involvement in the economic
sphere from the beginning; Heavy emphasis on
externally oriented growth from about the Second
Five-Year Plan period (1967-1971); Concentration
on heavy and chemical industries in the Third
Plan period (1972-1976); Emphasis on high-tech
development from the Fourth Plan period (1977-
1981); and Legal and political support for cost
efficiency, including low wages. 50
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As a result of ROK economic policies, the South Korean 
economy went from $82 dollars per capita GNP in 1961 to
$1640 dollars per capita GNP in 1979.51  However, along with
rapid growth in the economy, Park’s authoritarian regime
paved the way for the future power of chaebols (corporate
conglomerates).  
This is significant because the connection between the
family-style chaebols and bureaucratic politics have been
credited to be one of the main causes for South Korea’s
economic failure in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. A
summary of this is as follows:
The financial crisis in South Korea is regarded
as the severest consequence since the beginning
of its industrialization in the early 1960s. 
During the financial crisis, South Korea
withstood the harshest economic recession of its
entire post-war history.  The unemployment rate
reached the highest level in 30 years and during
the first half of 1998, South Korea’s GDP shrunk
by 5.3%, marking the largest drop in the past few
decades.  Corporate bankruptcies soared sharply.
3,197 firms filed for bankruptcy during December
of 1997.  Industrial production also dropped by
as much as 12% between August 1997 and August
1998, and business investment plunged by 28.3% in
the third quarter of 1998 as compared to the same
period of the previous year. The basic economic
problems of South Korea stem from the latent
structure of its long-standing economic
fundamentals, which can be traced back through
the last thirty-five years of the country’s rapid
economic growth.  Working in conjunction with
these fundamental weaknesses is the excessive
expansion by the chaebols based on the “too-big-
to fail” premise.52  
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In short, starting in early 1996, South Korea suffered
severe terms of trade shocks.  As export prices fell,
expectations of future corporate earnings were revised
down, and the price of stock market shares and land fell.53 
From then on, the impressive South Korean economic growth
experienced serious setbacks until the Bank of Thailand
severed the Thai baht’s link to the US dollar in July 1997
that triggered the Asian financial crisis.  The South
Korean won, which was informally fixed against the US
dollar, came under downward pressure.  In an attempt to
vouchsafe the foreign debts of private institutions and to
defend the value of the currency, the Bank of Korea spent
tens of billions of dollars in foreign exchange reserves. 
By the third week of December, the foreign exchange
reserves were nearly exhausted, and the country stood on
the verge of international default.  As a result, the IMF
had to step in and bail out the South Korean economy. 54 
The ultimate effect this had on South Korea was to
change the ROK decision-makers’ view that military factors
were the primary threat against the ROK’s security.  Now
the South Korean leaders started to view security
comprehensively in that it encompassed political, military,
and economic factors.  These factors contributed to the
shift in the way the South Korean leaders viewed security. 
Consequently, instead of discrediting the North Korean
regime, the South Korean leaders wanted to find the means
that would bring positive results from the North Koreans. 55
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D. ROK ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY TOWARD THE DPRK
The ROK decision-makers developed a strategy to engage
the DPRK based on commercial liberal principles.  The
strategy used to engage the North Koreans was through
economic exchanges and cooperation that were initiated by
the South Korean government in 1988. At that time, South
Korea was preparing for the Summer Olympics in Seoul.  One
of the concerns of the South Korean government and the
international community was to deter North Korea’s
aggressive behavior toward the South.  
Thus, the South Korean leaders hoped that closer
inter-Korean economic cooperation would contribute to
reducing the tension that existed between the two Koreas.
Interlocking the economic welfare of the two Koreas and the
day-to-day personal interactions would eventually foster
mutual trust and reinforce positive attitudes toward a
common goal of unification.56   
In 1988, the Roh Tae-Woo administration initiated
South-North economic exchanges by announcing its intentions
to allow South Korean firms to engage in economic
transactions with North Korea in the so-called 7.7
declaration.57  This initiative was intended to provide a
turning point to the confrontational structure of the Cold
War and to begin a new era of inter-Korean exchanges and
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cooperation through liberalization and reconciliation.  For
example, in 1990, the South Korean government provided a
more legal framework: the Intra-Korean Exchanges and
Cooperation Act.  This act provided South Korean firms with
legal foundations, which regard South-North economic
exchanges as domestic transactions.
Then the Kim Young Sam administration tried to expand
economic exchanges and cooperation but experienced severe
fluctuations because of military-security tensions on the
Korean peninsula.58  In addition, the Kim Young Sam
administration’s policy was inconsistent in the sense that
it tried to use economic transactions as a leverage in
dealing with North Korea.  In other words, attempting to
link economics with politics was destined to fail since
North Korea did not have significant economic ties with
South Korea.  Thus North Korea did not feel threatened by
the policy measures of the Kim Young-Sam administration’s
severing economic ties.  To make things worse, the Kim
Young-Sam administration reversed its economic policies
toward the North several times during his five-year term
presidency.59  
Upon his inauguration in February 1998, South Korean
President Kim Dae Jung made his new overtures to North
Korea that are commonly referred to as the “sunshine
policy.”  As part of his sunshine policy, the Kim
administration has sought to de-link private economic
exchanges from political considerations in policy toward
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North Korea.  This is the first major substantive change
from the policy of the previous administration.60  
The sunshine policy that was designed to procure a
positive response from North Koreans was very similar to
the engagement strategy that the ROK used toward the PRC. 
In essence, the South Korean government made economic,
cultural, and social overtures to the DPRK in efforts to
improve relations.61  
After two years of his presidency, Kim Dae Jung
announced his initiative to build a South- North Economic
Community in his New Years Message of 2000.  He indicated
in his speech that the government of South Korea was ready
to help North Korea in improving its poor infrastructure
and in solving the structural problems of its agricultural
sector in a speech, named the ‘Berlin Declaration,”
delivered at the Free University of Berlin on March 9,
2000.  He presented four tasks to achieve peace and
unification in the Korean peninsula: (1) Assisting North
Korean economic recovery through South-North economic
cooperation; (2) Ceasing the Cold War in the Korean
peninsula; (3) Solving separated family problems; and (4)
Promoting official talks between the South and North Korean
governments.62  
During the initial stage, South-North Korean economic
exchanges and cooperation were performed along the lines of
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mere indirect trade.  These inter-Korean economic exchanges
and cooperation developed further to include processing
trade, in which South Korean firms provide capital and
North Korean provides labor.  
E. THE NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE
Despite the tremendous symbolism of the June 2000
summit meeting between the two Korean leaders, this has not
translated into a reduction of military tensions on the
Korean peninsula.  To the contrary, the Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet testified in February 2001: “we
have not yet seen a significant diminution of the threat
from the North to American and South Korean interests.”63
This is in part because the North Koreans still feared
a possible adverse effect of opening up economically.  In
addition, introducing liberal economic policies may change
and undermine one or more pillars of the juche belief
system.  The implementation of serious economic reform in
North Korea would require basic changes in the
“theopolitical” belief system that shapes and drives the
economic system.64  In the eyes of those who work to protect
juche, reform may be considered as “treason,” “blasphemy,”
or even a direct attack on the embalmed Kim Il Sung
himself.
In addition, another problem with reforming the
economic system is that it would cost party authorities
directly.65   Economic reforms, such as decentralization of
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bureaucratic planning or permitting self-management of
factories, to free industries from unproductive
intervention and allow the market to control production,
would either weaken or sever the links between the party-
government bureaucracy and the masses.  
Therefore, if increasing trade did not improve the
bilateral relationship and North Koreans firmly held on to
their belief in the Juche system, then the theory of
commercial liberalism would have failed in this situation.
However, backing away from North Korea economically is not
an option because it is clear that the DPRK’s economy is in
crisis and that, without significant external assistance,
collapse is inevitable.66  As a result, the commercial
liberalism theory can be modified slightly to fit the
circumstances on the Korean peninsula.  Thus, this next
section will examine the ROK’s attempt to engage North
Korea on a multilateral basis in order to prevent a crash
and to promote a soft-landing for the DPRK.
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V. MULTILATERALISM
Multilateralism is the most viable mechanism for the
South Koreans to induce Pyongyang to participate in the
international system.67  This is because the fate of the
North Koreans, whether the outcome produces a hard or soft
landing, affects not only the two Koreas, but also the
other countries in the region.  Therefore, it would be in
the best interests for all the countries in Northeast Asia
to cooperate.  However, because the fate of the North
Korean regime affects South Korea the most, other than
itself, the ROK leaders have taken the initiative to
establish dialogue between the concerned countries.  
Hence, the main goal of a multilateral forum for the
South Koreans is to create a habit of dialogue on a basis
of the mutual benefit of not having the North Korean regime
collapse (assuming that the other countries do want North
Korea to collapse).   In addition, the South Korean leaders
are advocating multilateralism because it complements the
existing bilateral relationships and does not aim to
replace them.68  In fact, multilateral forums can help
facilitate bilateral dialogue among nations and their
official or unofficial representatives who, for a variety
of reasons, may be unable to deal directly with one
another.69  
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to assess how a
multilateral institution such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
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Cooperation (APEC) group can do the following: 1) make the
North Korean government more transparent; and 2) induce
economic interdependence of North Korea’s economy with that
of the international system.  Eventually the by-product of
achieving these goals would prevent the North Korean regime
from collapsing in the medium to long term.  In the
meantime, economic aid given by North Korea’s neighbors
would stave off collapse in the immediate future. 
Therefore, this chapter will begin by giving a description
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
organization and its benefits that led the South Korean
leaders to join the multilateral forum.  Next, this chapter
will examine how APEC can make the North Korean regime more
transparent and make it interdependent with the other
countries in the region.  Finally, this chapter will
conclude with the North Koreans’ response to APEC and South
Korea’s multilateral efforts to engage the DPRK.
A. ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
 The aim of this section is to first give a brief
description of APEC.  Then this section will demonstrate
that the South Korean leaders decided to join APEC as a
result of the mutual benefits of economic interdependence.
B. BACKGROUND OF APEC AND SOUTH KOREA’S DECISION TO
PARTICIPATE IN APEC
The Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group
was founded in Canberra, November 1989 by a dozen Pacific
Rim countries including Australia, New Zealand, the United
States, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the six
ASEAN nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Philippines, and Brunei).  Later China, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan joined in 1991.  With the inclusion of Papua New
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Guinea, Mexico, Chile in 1994, and Peru, Russia, and
Vietnam in 1998, the membership of APEC increased to 21. 
The APEC members were termed “economies” rather than
countries or nations in deference to China’s sensitivities
over the participation of Taiwan and Hong Kong.70
 Despite the fact that APEC was conceived as a loose
forum for international dialogue, APEC has steadily
progressed toward achieving trade and investment
liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region.  For example, at
the first APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (AELM) in Seattle
in November 1993, the AELM produced the Vision Statement
that outlined the following objectives:
 to find cooperative ways to overcome the various
obstacles resulting from rapidly changing regional and
global economies;
 to support the expansion of the world economy and the
open multilateral trading system; and
 to continue the reduction of trade and investment
obstacles, permitting goods and services to move
freely among the members of APEC.71 
The objectives of these meetings were formed to provide the
institutional guidelines that the APEC economies had to
abide by.  In addition, the establishment of APEC was in
direct response to the growing interdependence of the Asia-
Pacific economies over the past two decades.  Desmond Ball
states: 
Economic factors, particularly the extraordinary
rates of economic growth and the high degree of
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economic interdependence, are changing both the
structure of security relations and the systemic
tendencies toward conflict or peace in the
region.72

Although, economic interdependence could potentially make
the security of one country vulnerable to another, the
members of APEC were optimistic about the economic
interdependence because they believed that the economic
grouping would contribute to greater prosperity in the
Asia-Pacific region through the increasingly free flow of
goods, finances, and services among member economies.  For
example, APEC’s intra-regional trade went up from 53.4
percent in 1980 to 63.2 percent in 1992.73  Moreover, in
1993, APEC accounted for 68.7 percent of South Korea’s
total trade, 81 percent of its incoming foreign investment,
and 77 percent of South Korea’s outgoing investment.74
Therefore, instead of focusing on the negative aspects of
interdependence, the members of APEC chose to capitalize on
the benefits of increasing trade in the region.
Along those lines, the APEC members hoped that the
economic interdependence from the increasing trade would
indirectly contribute to peace and stability in the region
because stability was regarded as crucial for economic
development as well.75  Eventually, the growing economic
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interdependence among the members of APEC in the long run
could transform international relations in the Asia-Pacific
from a zero-sum to a positive-sum game. Therefore, based on
the mutual benefits of trade, South Korean President Kim
Dae Jung is hoping to induce support for the North Koreans
to participate in APEC.76  
Although the mutual benefits of economic
interdependence were logical reasons for the South Koreans
to join APEC, the question still remained: how could it be
applied to the North Korean problem?  After all, North
Korea is not yet a member of APEC.  This seems to pose a
dilemma for the South Korean leaders.  How can APEC help
the North Korean regime to become more transparent as well
as prevent it from collapsing?  Thus, the next section will
discuss how the multilateral forum can be utilized to help
the North Korean economic crisis.
C. HOW CAN APEC HELP THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC CRISIS?
Although North Korea is not yet a member of APEC, the
multilateral forum still offers many benefits to the North
Koreans.  One benefit is that a multilateral forum would
allow the North Koreans to engage in a dialogue with
countries that it is not on best terms.  For example, the
DPRK can interact with the United States and Japan in an
official or unofficial capacity.  Earlier in this chapter,
this thesis stated that the main goal of APEC for the South
Koreans was to create a habit of dialogue to prevent the
North Korean regime from collapsing. In essence, the
dialogue between North Korea and the APEC members serves as
a set of confidence building measures (CBMs).  
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These CBMS would have two purposes.  One, the dialogue
would promote a gradual evolution to transparency between
North Korea and the other countries.  Two, the continuous
dialogue could lead to better appreciation of the concerns,
interests, and perceptions of the participating countries. 
Moreover, the continuous dialogue would lead to mutual
understanding and trust, thereby preventing the
misinterpretations that could cause tensions or even
conflict.77 These dialogue meetings between North Korea and
the other countries do not have to solely center on
economic issues, but can be utilized to discuss unresolved
problems.
A case in point where a multilateral forum such as
APEC can improve bilateral relationships through dialogue
is the relationship between North Korea and Japan.  The
rapport between the two countries can be described as
cautious. This is especially true for the Japanese.  Hyung-
Kook Kim wrote that the Japanese took a cautious attitude
for two reasons.
First of all, the Japanese leaders were searching
for an alternative way to contribute to world
peace and stability other than “checkbook”
diplomacy.  Frustrated with the domestic and
international criticism of Japan’s $13 billion
contribution to the allied forces during the Gulf
Crisis, the Japanese leaders were trying to build
a new image of Japan as a peacemaker.  The second
reason for the cautious attitude of Japan has to
do with its concern with the possible domino
effect of compensation.  Japan needs to consider
the reaction of other countries, such as the PRC
and Southeast Asian countries.78   
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In addition, the North Koreans did not improve Japan’s
attitude toward them with the missile launch over Japan on
August 31, 1998.  Shocked by the surprise test that
illustrated to the world North Korea’s long-range missile
capabilities, the Japanese became deeply concerned about
their security.79 As a result of the North Korean missile
launch, the Japanese froze economic cooperation with the
DPRK.  In spite of this event, APEC could help improve the
tenuous relationship between North Korea and Japan by
allowing the opportunity for more dialogue between the two
countries.  The opportunity for this can arise during the
summit meeting of the APEC members.  Although North Korea
is not a member, it can be bought in as a guest.
Continuous dialogue is not the only benefit of a
multilateral organization.  Another advantage is that APEC
can further facilitate trade between the members and North
Korea. This, in turn, would spur regional economic
cooperation.  Eventually, this regional cooperation would
turn into economic interdependence.  Hand in hand with
increasing trade, the legal framework for APEC can pave the
way for economic liberalization in North Korea.  An
indication that the mutual benefit of trade is becoming an
increasingly important factor to the North Koreans is the
value of its trading partners.  For instance, Japan and
South Korea are the two major export nations of North
Korea.  According to the North Korea Economy Review issued
by Korea Development Institute (KDI) in the ROK 
North Korea has exported 36 percent of its total
exports worth $260 million to Japan in 2000,
mostly consisting of textiles, smokeless coal and
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fishery products.  Meanwhile South Korea made up
22 percent of North Korea’s total exports worth
$150 million, a 25.3 percent increase from last
year. 80 

In conjunction, North Korea’s major import nations are also
APEC economies such as China and Hong Kong.  In 2000, the
Chinese exported crops and grain products in addition to
crude oil worth $450 million making up 27 percent of the
North’s whole imports.81 
D. DPRK’S RESPONSE TO APEC
 Overall, the ROK’s level of success in engaging the
DPRK through APEC to solve the North Korean economic
problems and help it integrate into the international
system was not good for two specific reasons. The first
reason was that the North Koreans were ambivalent
participants.  The North Koreans have refused to mitigate
its philosophy of juche and half-heartedly fulfilled basic
economic reforms.  Thus, by refusing to become a more
positive player in the East Asian region, the DPRK has
practically boxed itself in, to the point where the current
government is faced with attempting reforms that would most
certainly bring about the forced dismantling of the regime.  
The second reason why South Korea’s efforts failed to
induce North Korea into a multilateral forum was because
each country had different interests.  On one hand, the ROK
wanted to help the DPRK integrate into the international
system to prevent it from collapsing as well as to deter
them from acting like a rogue state.  Unfortunately, the
DPRK did not want to relinquish its sovereignty and
continued to remain elusive and unpredictable.   Although
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81 Ibid. pp.2
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the North Koreans wanted to remain autonomous, they were
forced to accept help because their economy was rapidly
declining and letting the North Korean economy continue to
decline into oblivion was not an option because the outcome
would lead to regional instability.   As a result, the only
recourse available to South Korea and the other players in
the region was to ensure that North Korea’s economic
integration into the international economy was as
controlled and painless as possible.  Therefore, the next
chapter will examine the limitations of multilateralism and
propose a solution to overcome these limitations.
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VI. LIMITED MULTILATERALISM
This thesis proposes that a multilateral alternative
to APEC is the Tumen River Area Development Program
(TRADP).  The TRADP can be perceived as a limited
multilateral vehicle because it provides an opportunity to
develop closer relations with North Korea and other
Northeast Asian countries without the full legal bindings
that APEC had.  This way, the South Koreans could utilize
TRADP as an effective way to overcome the legalities that
APEC imposed on its members and then TRADP could focus
solely on the economic development of the countries that
are involved in the program, especially the North Korean
economy.  More importantly, the economic motivation behind
TRADP is also based on commercial liberalism principles in
that there are mutual economic benefits.  In time, economic
interdependence will occur and eventually this would lead
to a more stable regime.  
 With this in mind, the South Korean leadership should
seriously revamp their efforts in the TRADP.  Thus, this
chapter will examine the effectiveness of utilizing the
Tumen River Program as an economic confidence-building
measure (CBM) as the basis for regional stability because
trade and security issues have always had a symbiotic
relationship.82  The goals here are as follows: 1) increase
economic trade between North Korea and its regional
neighbors; 2) draw the North Koreans into a multilateral
setting without the full impact of the legalities of an
institution; and 3) increase and improve bilateral
relationships between North Korea and the other countries. 
                    
82 Olsen, Edward.  “Tumen Project CBM: An American Strategic
Critique.”  Asian Perspective, Vol.19, No.2, Fall-Winter 1995, pp 53.
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In their efforts to fulfill these goals, North Korea would
have to adopt a reform program entailing very limited
opening and liberalization.  Before this paper discusses
the goals of the Tumen River Program, this paper will give
a brief description of the project.
A. BACKGROUND ON THE TUMEN RIVER AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
 The Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP) was a
regional project of the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) to accelerate the development of the Tumen River
area on a multilateral basis.83 Given the immense political
and institutional hurdles, UNDP aimed to alleviate the
existing obstacles to the expansion of trade and
investment, and to create an “enabling environment” in the
medium term.84  Since, the meeting in Ulan Bator in July
1991, the TRADP has served as a testing ground for the
expansion of sub-regional development cooperation among
Northeast Asian countries with dissimilar political and
economic systems.  
 The overall objectives of TRADP are to facilitate regional
cooperation in trade development, investment promotion and
environmental management, and to promote sustainable
economic and social development in Northeast Asia and the
Tumen River Economic Development Area (TREDA) in
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particular.  The TRADP strategy seeks cooperation in the
formulation and implementation of practical short-term and
medium-term Action Plans that are intended to build
confidence in bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
B. THE ROK AND TRADP
Since July 1991, when the UNDP formally took over the
TRADP, the ROK has been actively involved in its
discussions.  It hosted the first Program Management
Committee (PMC) in Seoul in February 1992.  The ROK held
Working Group meetings on telecommunications and industry,
and committed $5 million ($1 million every year) in
contributions towards the successful conclusion of pre-
feasibility studies.85  The South Koreans have major motives
for their participation as the leaders wish to utilize the
multilateral forum to talk with North Korean counterparts
in a more open manner, and induce North Korea to shift to a
gradual opening of its closed economy.  The South Korean
leaders hope that frequent and patient dialogue with their
North Korean counterparts would help the DPRK to better
understand the merits of an open-door policy, as well as to
maintain peace and prosperity on the peninsula.
However, it is important that the ROK leaders have
acknowledged that there are still many difficulties in
making TRADP a successful economic model, such as a lack of
resources and investment.  Despite these problems, the ROK
leaders assert that the project has brought the countries
in the region more cooperation.86 Therefore, this next
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section will outline the goals that the ROK leaders hope to
achieve by using the TRADP as an engagement tool to bring
the North Koreans into the international community and to
solve the North Korean economic crisis.  
C. GOALS OF THE TRADP
 The first goal of TRADP is to increase economic trade
between North Korea and its regional neighbors. Though it
is difficult to prove empirically the direct positive
correlation between the start of TRADP and the expansion of
inter-regional trade, there is evidence that suggests that
TRADP has contributed to trade expansion by bringing about
increased foreign investment, higher growth, and an
improvement of trade supporting mechanisms such as
transportation.  In particular, one can find a positive
causation extending from the improvement of transportation
and the opening of new transport routes, to the expansion
of inter-regional trade.  Moreover, there is evidence that
suggests that TRADP has contributed to trade expansion by
bringing about increased foreign investment, higher growth,
and an improvement of trade supporting mechanisms such as
transportation.  In particular, one can find a positive
causation extending from the improvement of transportation
and the opening of new transport routes, to the expansion
of transit trade through the Tumen River Economic
Development Area (TREDA) ports.  The growth of transit
trade may eventually contribute to the expansion of formal
inter-regional trade among Northeast Asian countries.  
This is due to the combination of two effects: First,
the increase of TRADP-related infrastructural investments
that may reduce transport distance and transport costs. As
a result, a substantial proportion of existing trade volume
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will be diverted from other ports (e.g Dalian) to TREDA
ports. Second, investment expansion in TREDA may augment a
trade increase.  The former effect is supported by the fact
that 7,690 tons of cargo was diverted from Dalian to TREDA
ports during 1992, and the volume rose by 39.1 percent to
10,696 tons in 1993.  Diversion of Japanese cargo from
ocean transportation to the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) is
also conceivable in the future.87  
Although it is difficult to measure the exact growth
of the yearly transit trade volume among Northeast Asian
nations, it is confirmed from various sources that transit
trade through major TREDA ports of Rajin, Chongjin,
Zarubino, Vladivostok, and Nakhodka have grown
significantly since the establishment of TRADP.  This
evidence is supported by the significant growth in the
volume of transit cargo passing through the road crossings
of Tumen, Sanhe, Shatouzi, and Kaishantun.  For instance,
the total trade through Tumen border post that had been
only 1.37 million tons in 1991, grew to 1.84 million tons
in 1992, and to 2.4 million tons in 1993.88 By 2003, the
trade gained through the TREDA ports is estimated to reach
about 59 million tons.89  Although the UNDP states the area
has attracted $1.5 billion in investment, the actual figure
is believed to be below $1 billion,90 most of it comes from
South Korean companies investing on the Chinese side.  
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The second goal of TRADP is to draw the North Koreans
into a multilateral setting without the full impact of the
legalities of an institution.  This way the North Koreans
can start with the minimum structural framework.  For
example, the North Koreans have stated that they will
allocate funds for the required infrastructure in the
Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone (FTZ), including industrial
estates for key industries, facilities to accommodate a
sizable influx of foreigners, local mangers and workers,
rail and highway links.  Then in November 1992, the North
Koreans started to put the legal framework into place with
a foreign investment law, a joint-venture law, and a
foreign corporation law.  The emphasis on the series of
legal reforms represents concrete CBMs.  Moreover, these
steps regarding the FTZ are commendable because it
definitely represents a break with the past and reveals
that the policy-making authorities are serious about the
FTZ scheme and desire to overcome the concerns and
anxieties of potential foreign investors.91 The need to
attract foreign investment in the area led Kim Si-Jin, Vice
Chairman, Korea Committee for Promotion of External
Economic Cooperation, DPRK, to express in the ninth
Northeast Asia Economic Forum held in Tianjin, China
October 1999, that “the Rajin-Sonbong Economic and Trade
Zone is an important component of development of the Tumen
River Area, and the success in the latter is inconceivable
without the Rajin-Sonbong Zone.”92 In fact, the North
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Koreans’ positive response to the Tumen project is better
than its reaction to APEC because the DPRK feels that
unlike APEC, the Tumen Project is not threatening to the
regime.  Wheegook Kim states, “The DPRK’s hesitation to
open its door to foreigners except in the isolated zone at
the mouth of the Tumen River is understandable.  Pyongyang
fears the attraction of foreign investment and expansion of
foreign trade may liberalize the society and cause its
regime to be overthrown, as occurred in the East European
countries.”93 However, despite North Korea’s fear of opening
its society, the government’s participation in the Tumen
project illustrates that the country has acknowledged the
mutual economic benefits of TRADP and are willing to
participate.
The final goal of TRADP is to increase and improve
bilateral relationships between North Korea and the other
countries.  Improving bilateral relations is very important
to the success of the TRADP because this has been the main
hindering factor of the existing multilateral regimes.  On
the broad scope, regional political ideologies have
improved over time, especially since China normalized its
relations with Japan and the United States in the 1970s. 
Now it is time for the DPRK to normalize with the other
countries in the region.  This progress can be aided due to
the fact that the concept of economic and social
development is undergoing a fundamental transformation. The
growing economic compatibility and harmonization of
different cultures and economic systems plays the role of
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the strongest security guarantor.  Hence, the principles of
commercial liberalism are a fundamental factor in the South
Korean decision-makers’ line of thinking.
D. CONTINUING VIABILITY OF TRADP AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
ROK-U.S. RELATIONS
The Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP) has
the ingredients to become an effective limited multilateral
forum.  This is because the evolution of strategies for
TRADP has transitioned from “institutional” to “economic”
issues.  In 1994, an informal meeting between the UNDP and
four members countries (absent the DPRK) agreed to place a
greater emphasis on the economic rather than the legal and
institutional aspects of TRADP.94  Since then, the focus of
TRADP has been dismantling the institutional barriers to the
expansion of trade and investment.  This is significant
because the “institutionalism” of APEC was one of the
reasons why the North Koreans were reluctant to join the
organization.  However, the North Koreans’ lukewarm reaction
to APEC does not mean that they will not join APEC in the
future. On the contrary, North Korea’s participation in
TRADP could serve as a starting ground for the DPRK leaders
to be involved in a multilateral setting.  In fact, Dr. Gaye
Christoffersen was quoted as stating that regional economic
cooperation regimes such as APEC see the merits of lower-
level regimes like TRADP.95
Last, but not least, the Tumen River Program has
inadvertently helped the ROK’s overall reunification goals
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as the TRADP’s twenty-year scope lets the North Koreans
gradually ease themselves toward a market economy. This in
turn narrows the differences between the two Koreas as they
try to foster unification.  
However, in order to make TRADP a success, it needs the
support or more likely the financial backing from the United
States.  Yet, the Tumen River Program has not gained very
much interest in the United States for several reasons. 
First, the location of the project is quite unusual.  North
Korea has expanded its economic zone hoping for promote
investment, but without United States participation,
investment in the region is moving slowly.  United States
investors are not able to invest in the North Korean region
according the US law, because of poor diplomatic relations. 
The restrictions not only limit US investors, but also the
recent tensions with North Korea's nuclear weapons create
unwanted tension.  Investors are more likely to invest in a
worry-free area where they do not have to contend with the
instability of the country.
In addition, the U.S. leadership is still wary of Kim
Jong Il’s commitment to improve bilateral relations with
its southern neighbor as well as with the other countries
in the region. Since President George W. Bush came into
office in 2001, his administration has categorized North
Korea as a foe.   
Moreover, since the Sept 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
against the United States, President George W. Bush called
the North Korean regime a part of the “axis of evil” along
with Iraq and Iran.  According to an article written in the
Far Eastern Economic Review, the authors observe:
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The hardliners in Washington believe Seoul is
naively pursuing engagement with an enemy that
will not reciprocate its goodwill.  “The Sunshine
Policy is dead,” says Nicholas Eberstadt, a Korea
specialist at the American Enterprise Institute,
a conservative think-tank.  “The autopsy will
show that Sunshine was killed by the North Korean
government.”  In addition, in a trip to South
Korea, President Bush declared that, “I’m
troubled by a regime (North Korea) that tolerates
starvation.” 96

Comments like these from Korea experts in Washington
undermine the validity of South Korean President Kim Dae
Jung’s “Sunshine Policy.”  In addition, the negative view
from the United States also concerns academics in South
Korea.  For example, Chung Moon-In, an advisor to the ROK
government, states that “We don’t want war, but the way the
U.S. is going might trigger an uncontrollable escalation. 
America is making a big mistake.”97  Moreover, not only does
the tougher American stance worry the South Koreans, but
President Bush’s Axis of Evil speech has also put the North
Koreans on edge. Ultimately this makes it more difficult
for the South Koreans to persuade the North Koreans to
participate in multilateral forums that focus on getting
the North Koreans to engage in dialogue with the other
countries in the region. 
The United States is also concerned about the DPRK’s
continuing to sell weapons of mass destruction.  In light
of the Bush administration’s strong response to terrorism,
the United States could support the halt of all economic
aid to the North Korea.  This unilateral action by the U.S.
could seriously cripple the ability of the South Koreans to
                    
96 Larkin, John and Murray Hiebert.  “Axis Of Uncertainty.”  Far
Eastern Economic Review February 18, 2002 pp 12.
97 Ibid, pp 13.
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elicit cooperation from the North Koreans on a friendly
measure.  That is why it is even more important that South
Korea utilizes a multilateral forum to ensure that engaging
the North Koreans in a cooperative manner will not be swept
aside.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MULTILATERAL EFFORTS IN THE FUTURE
 Since his inauguration in February 1998, President Kim
Dae Jung has made it evident with his “Sunshine Policy”
that the South Koreans are willing to extend the olive
branch to their northern neighbors. Although there has been
a limited response from the North Koreans to the South
Korean effort, the DPRK has begun to see the merits of
interacting with the ROK.  This is evident from the
increasing inter-Korean trade. However, the enormous
political and economic price of helping the North Koreans
into the international system has demonstrated to the South
Koreans that they can not take on this feat alone.  Whether
the multilateral vehicle for this purpose happens to be
APEC or the Tumen Project, it is clear that the South
Koreans should be the ones who spearhead the effort. In
addition, it is important for the South Korean leaders to
stress that APEC and the Tumen Project serve as confidence
building measures because they facilitate dialogue between
North Korea and the other countries in the region.  In the
2001 APEC summit meeting in Shanghai, President Kim Dae
Jung continued to seek support from the members for Seoul’s
engagement policy toward North Korea and to advance trade
and investment ties with the DPRK.98  
                    
98 “ROK President Kim To Seek Support For Sunshine Policy At APEC
Summit.”  FBIS 10 OCT 2001, pp.2.
  58
On balance, it is necessary for the South Koreans and
the other countries in the region, especially the United
States, to have patience for the North Korean regime. 
After more than fifty years of hardlined ideas ingrained
into them, the North Koreans are not going to easily give
up their ways and adopt a market economy.  Moreover, the
health of the North Korean economy is also dependent on the
status of the other countries’ economies.  As a result it
could take years and maybe even decades before the North
Koreans will recover from their current economic crisis.  
Nevertheless, the North Koreans are making some
important institutional, if not behavioral, reforms. 
Chung-in Moon states, “the amended socialist constitution
in 1998 has introduced market elements in its economic
system by emphasizing the importance of cost, price and
profit.”99   Therefore, the short-term as well as a long
range solution for the South Koreans is to continue to get
regional cooperation to help the North Koreans from
collapsing.  If the DPRK regime falls due to an economic
crisis, all the countries in the region would agree that it
would create future instability on the Korean peninsula,
thereby affecting regional security.
                    
99 Moon, Chung-in.  “Understanding the DJ Doctrine.”  Kim Dae-jung
Government and Sunshine Policy.  Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg,
eds. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999, pp 50.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Since the division of the Korean nation into the two
Koreas, the DPRK posed the greatest security threat to the
ROK.  However, the increasing effects of globalism showed
that economic factors were also a security concern.  Thus,
the South Korean leaders shifted away from their realist
mentality to that of commercial liberalism in order to
better manage their security threats.  
In conjunction, throughout the Cold War, the South
Korean economy became stronger due to fact that its economy
was integrated in the international economy.  While
integration caused economic growth, it also created
vulnerabilities.  The 1997 Asian financial crisis
demonstrated to the South Korean leaders how vulnerable its
economy was to exogenous factors.  Because the ROK’s own
economy had been destabilized in the 1997 Asian financial
crisis, it has weakened South Korea’s ability to help the
North Korean Economy.  This means that the chance of the
North Korean regime collapsing from its poor economy is
greater. 
Moreover, the North Koreans were unwilling to engage
the South Koreans on a broad-scale bilateral level. This
was because the North Korean regime feared that opening up
its economy would bring the downfall of its regime. For
them, the realist mentality still was relevant.  As a
result, although the inter-Korean trade brought some
improvements in the DPRK economy, it did not change the way
that the North Koreans viewed the South Koreans.  Due to
the fact that the ROK was not successful in engaging the
DPRK on a broad-scale bilateral basis, it tried to induce
the North Koreans into a multilateral forum.  Again, the
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South Koreans hoped that integrating the North Korean
economy with that of other countries would change the
DPRK’s behavior.  Over time, the ROK leaders hoped that the
DPRK would see the benefits from increasing trade and view
South Korea and other countries as cooperative partners
rather than competitive adversaries. Thus, the ultimate
goal was to change North Korea’s behavior to become less
“roguish” and adhere to the rules on the international
society.   
In order to make the North Korean regime less
“roguish”, this thesis examined APEC as a viable
multilateral forum.  APEC was chosen for several reasons. 
One reason was because the South Korean leaders hoped that
by having the North Koreans participate in a multilateral
forum it would make the DPRK regime more transparent. 
Another reason was because the APEC group focused on the
commercial liberal principles such as economic
interdependence.  In fact, it was the mutual benefits of
economic interdependence through increasing trade that led
the South Korean leaders themselves to participate in APEC.  
Despite the good intentions of the South Koreans and
the other countries in the region to induce the North
Koreans into APEC, the North Koreans have yet to become
members.   First of all, the North Koreans are refusing to
give up their philosophy of juche and want to implement
reforms under North Korea’s own system.  As a result, the
DPRK has put itself in a very perilous position.  This is
because, if the leadership seriously attempts to reform its
economy, these actions could most certainly bring about the
forced dismantling of the current regime. This in turn
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could create a new type of instability on the Korean
peninsula. 
In addition, South Korea’s efforts to induce North
Korea into a multilateral forum did not come to fruition
because each country had different interests.  On one hand,
the ROK wanted to help the DPRK integrate into the
international system to prevent it from collapsing as well
as to deter them from acting like a “rogue” state.  On the
other hand, the DPRK did not want to relinquish its
sovereignty and continued to remain elusive and
unpredictable.  Moreover, the South Koreans wanted the
North Koreans involved in a full-fledged legal institution. 
Again, the North Koreans showed resistance to legal reforms
that would dismantle the regime.  
Due to the fact that the North Koreans are resistant
to any legal changes in their government, this thesis
proposed that the South Koreans focus their efforts upon
making the Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP) a
success.  TRADP is considered a viable limited multilateral
forum because it does not impose the legal reforms that
APEC demands of its members.  Although the program still
faces some difficulties today, mainly due to lack of
investment, the South Koreans need to continue to push the
development of TRADP.  This is especially important in
light of the current U.S. administration’s tougher stance
on the North Koreans.  Furthermore, the South Koreans
should continue to advocate TRADP because the program
itself serves as a crucial confidence-building measure
between North Korea and the other countries.  
As long as North Korea is in economic decline, the
South Koreans must strive to help their northern neighbors
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from further deterioration to avoid having to deal with a
future collapsed regime and its costs.  This means that the
South Korean leaders must engage in limited multilateral
programs that put emphasis on the economic development of
North Korea without destabilizing the current regime.  The
underlying purpose of the gradual opening up of North Korea
is to prevent the regime from collapsing and creating an
unstable environment.  The problem of instability weighs
heavily on the minds of the South Koreans because their own
economic situation is still mending from the 1997 Asian
financial crisis.  In addition, the ROK election is set for
December 2002.  There is a possibility that the newly
elected president will not follow in the footsteps of Kim
Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy.”  Combined with President
Bush’s tougher policy, the abandonment of the “Sunshine
Policy” could spell serious trouble for the North Koreans.  
Certainly, all the countries in the region would agree
that the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime whether
from economic causes or other factors, would not be good
for regional stability.  Therefore, the current South
Korean administration should continue to press for
multilateral efforts that stress the mutual benefits of
economic interdependence to engage the North Koreans. 
President Kim Dae Jung’s appeal to the APEC members in
Shanghai expressed this thought.  In addition, the current
government should try to ensure that the future
administration pursues multilateral efforts, such as TRADP
because these vehicles allow the DPRK to learn how to
interact in a multilateral setting without have to undergo
radical institutional changes.  
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In conclusion, this thesis argued that multilateral
efforts based on the commercial liberal principle of
economic interdependence would decrease the security threat
on the Korean peninsula.  Although the tension on the
peninsula has not gone away, the North Korean government
has begun to see the mutual benefits of trade.  As North
Korea’s trade increases with the other countries in the
region it is likely to become more interdependent with the
other countries in the region.  Thus, countries that North
Korea has been traditionally adversarial with, such as
South Korea and Japan, can become important trading
partners for the DPRK. 
Ultimately the economic interdependence of these
economies would force the North Koreans to acknowledge to
themselves, as well as internationally, that it would be
self-defeating if the DPRK disturbed the trade by engaging
in a conflict.  Until that time occurs, it is necessary for
the South Koreans to stress patience in dealing with the
North Korean regime.
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